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Introduction
As of now, most of the world's major fisheries have reached a state of crisis. Nearly all of them remain fully exploited with at least one-third of them over-exploited (FAO, 2001) . As more and more economies have started pursuing the path of economic globalisation the market induced fishing pressure is expected to increase further. Unless proper management mechanisms are put in place, the fisheries might fall into an inextricable peril -not only the fisheries, but alongwith them, lives of millions of fishing people who depend on them for their livelihood. It is estimated that about 95 % of the world fishers are small-scale fishers (around 200 million) for whom fishing is not only a means of living but also a way of life (ibid). Fisheries are therefore to be viewed as a human phenomenon. If so, fishery management devoid of the fishing people does not make sense.
Management of fisheries can have manifold objectives. Sustaining a biological and economic equilibrium is essential. But at the same time, in the developing countries that are characterised by very high density of fishing population in the coastal regions with very little opportunities for alternative employment, social considerations like employment expansion, raising the standard of living etc becomes equally imperative, if not more. That is why Panayotou advocates a bio-socio-economic equilibrium to be the primary objective of fishery management in the developing countries (Panayotou, 1982) .
Realisation of any such objective requires certain control over the nature and levels of fishing effort. Clear and distinct regulations and their effective enforcement are called for in this regard. That is, institutions do matter.
It is true that some of the traditional fishing communities have had certain institutional arrangements for managing the fisheries and they evolved in their specific ecological, social and cultural context. " A diversity of societies in the past and present have independently devised, maintained, or adapted communal arrangements to manage common property resources. Their persistence is not an historical accident; these arrangements build on knowledge of the resource and cultural norms that have evolved and been tested over time" (Feeny, Berkes, McCay and Acheson, 1990: 13) . However, in the course of time, many such institutions have undergone changes, innovations and even disintegration (Baland and Platteau, 1996) . How do such institutional evolutions take place? Are they spontaneous movements or incremental changes? Which are the factors that influence institutional evolution? Interestingly, such questions related to institutional evolution have become one of the central concerns of the New Institutional Economics (Drobak and Nye, 1997).
Also, fortunately, a robust literature concerning the ways of managing community resources by traditional societies have arisen ever since the publication of the (NRC, 1987) . In India, where millions of people depend on common property resources like village forests, irrigation systems, coastal fisheries etc there do exist different types of institutional arrangements and there are studies on their nature and functions (Raychoudhury, 1968; Wade, 1988; Jodha, 1990; Mathew, 1991; Gadgil and Guha, 1992; Kurien and Vijayan, 1995; Bavinck, 2001 etc.) . However, one general limitation within this literature is that very few studies discuss the important question of evolution of institutions or institutional change.
Proceedings of the Conference on Common Property Resource Management
Coming to the marine fishery sector of Kerala, there has been in existence a very ancient institutional arrangement called Kadakkodi. It is not only a conflict resolution mechanism such as the caste panchayats which were quite popular in rural India (Baxi, 1982) but also a resource management system. But, unfortunately, no serious research interest has gone into its operation, let alone its evolution. This paper is an attempt to fill this research gap. In the backdrop of Kadakkodi, we address the broad question of institutional evolution.
known for the hoary tradition of fishing and fish trade and for its resource abundance (Velupillai, 1940; Day, 1865) . Kerala, though claims only about 7 % of India's coast line, possesses the most productive fishery in the country that contributes almost a quarter of the national production and export of marine products.
Fishing population of Kerala deserves a special mention. Kerala coast is the most densely populated coast in India. While the population density of Kerala (750 / km 2 ) is almost double that of national average, the density in the marine villages of Kerala is as high as 2330 / km 2 (Kurien, 2001) . Also it is unique of Kerala coast that the fishing community is almost equally distributed to three different religions -Hindus, Muslims, and Christians -(33, 31, and 36 % respectively). Interestingly, there is seen a regional concentration of these groups. While Christian fishers are in majority in the southern districts of Kerala the Muslims are concentrated in the northern districts and Hindus dominate the central region (and the northernmost district, Kasargode). Generally, there remains religious harmony apart from sporadic conflicts between Christian and Muslim 1 Kerala is known for its development experience of having achieved relatively higher levels of quality of life for its people despite its low levels of per capita State Domestic Product. It is observed that an important facor responsible for such an experience (popularly known as Kerala Model of Development) is the 'collaborative and adversarial public action' (Dreze and Sen, 1993) . It is also interesting to observe that Kerala is the first state in the world where Communist Party could come into power through a democratic election (in 1957). fishermen in the southern district, Trivandrum. The fishing community belongs to the lower strata of Indian caste hierarchy and their standard of living left much to be desired.
Fishing technology employed in the fishery has been quite diverse. Different types of craft -gear combinations have been in use to suit the multiplicity of fish species, their seasonality, and the heterogeneous oceanographic conditions 2 . Until the introduction of mechanised gillnetters and bottom trawlers through the Indo-Norwegian Project (INP) in the early 1950s, fishing technology remained quite artisanal and used only manual oaring or sailing for propulsion. The other hallmarks of this technology were the use of selective and passive gears, low capital commitments, use of traditional knowledge and fishing skills, fishing more for subsistence and the local markets, and an egalitarian ownership of fishing implements in which owners were mostly owner-workers.
Traditional was the term popularly used in Kerala to represent this sector. The converse was the case in the mechanised sector. However, at present, still more ramifications and complexities are observed in the fishing technology. Within the traditional sector itself another segment has developed since 1980, namely, a motorised sector with crafts fitted with outboard motors for propulsion. As an offshoot of motorisation the gear and craft size have increased enormously with commensurate increase in capital investment.
Besides, many of these units operate gears known as ring seines and mini trawls that are not legally permitted. Thus the term traditional has become diluted in this segment.
Nonetheless, some of the major characteristics pertaining to traditional sector such as the livelihood motive of fishing operation, worker -owner pattern of ownership, labour intensive fishing, same old institutional arrangements etc still hold here. Moreover, fishermen themselves, their organisations and also the government still considers motorised sector too as a part of the traditional sector. Therefore, in our analysis, the term traditional sector, would refer to both non-motorised and the motorised segments.
In the mechanised sector too many technical diversifications have taken place. Though it started with 32 footer gillnetters and bottom trawlers, their sizes have increased to 42-45 feet; later, purse seiners have been added; and of recent, an ultra modern sector of very large vessels (even 64 feet long) with fish-finding devices and other sophisticated technology is also coming up.
Institutional arrangements for fishery management were not alien to Kerala fishery.
Both community-based informal institutions as well as formal ones are existent. The most important community-based management institution has been the kadakkodi or "seacourt" system that exists in the northern parts of Kerala coast. In the south, though there has been a 'vacuum in the realm of village-based traditional fishery institutions' (Kurien, 2001: 206) collective action of the fishermen that led to the introduction of a formal institution for regulating the fishery, namely, the Kerala Marine Fisheries Regulation Act (KMFRA) in 1980 and thereafter ban on bottom trawling during monsoon in 1988 was much stronger there than other parts of Kerala. It also deserves mention that church had initiated certain management measures in Trivandrum district in terms of construction of artificial reefs for fish aggregation and rejuvenation ( Fernandez, 1994; Kurien, 1995) and prohibition of use of light during night fishing (Rajan, 1995) .
With this brief overview we shall go into the study of Kadakkodies. Before discussing the evolution of kadakkodies , let us first understand their nature and functions.
Kadakkodies -their Nature and Functions
A rich diversity of informal institutions of conflict resolution existed in Indian villages and the most notable among them were the caste panchayats (Baxi, 1982) . Also we have noted above that informal institutions for collective management of natural resources have been present. Kadakkodies might be viewed as a combination of both these.
Kadakkodi, though literally means sea-court is in fact more than a court for it functions as a legislative, executive, and judiciary body that enacts regulations for fishing operations; enforces the regulations; and resolves the conflicts. It is a very old institutional arrangement that has prevailed throughout the marine villages of northern Kerala and still active in some of the coastal villages.
It is interesting to find that despite the similarity in functions and regulations the organisational structure varies across space. 
Kannur Model
Fishing community in Kannur district has been heterogeneous in terms of religion. It consists predominantly of Hindus, followed by Muslims and a few Christians. Thanks to this multi-community composition, the kadakkodies developed a secular structure. The general body consists of valakkars and they select an executive body consisting of president, vice -president, a few elders, and a messenger (called 'police').
Vadakara Model
This too has a secular nature. A specific feature of kadakkodies in Vadakara taluk is that all the seven kadakkodies of this taluk are nested into a federation. Apart from the respective general bodies and executive bodies there is an Action Committee comprising of selected members from each kadakkodi. Along with these few regulations a large set of rules and procedures exist in the kadakkodies for conflict resolutions. It is an accepted norm that all fishery related conflicts are first to be brought to kadakkodies for settlement. Very meticulous is the trial procedure. The fairness of kadakkodi judgements has been well acclaimed. Usual issues that come for settlement are problems of bonded labour 6 , compensation for destruction of fishing crafts or gear, dispute over fishing certain schools of fish targeted by some others and so on. Once a written complaint is received in the kadakkodi, certain definite procedure is followed: parties are summoned for trial in the executive body which convenes usually in the beach; witnesses are also interrogated; at the end of the hearing judgement is announced by the judges. There is also a provision for appeal by the parties.
Certain kadakkodies are recognised as appellate bodies. Kannur kadakkodi was one such appellate kadakkodi. The verdict of the appellate kadakkodi was considered final.
Evolution of Kadakkodies
It would be interesting to study how such a system evolved over time. Insights from theories of institutional evolution can throw more light into the analysis.
Theoretical considerations
Any evolution could be defined as the process of creation, selection (abandonment), and organisation of choices and choice rules (Willman, 2000) . Innovation entails new choices. Nevertheless, once we assume that any given situation entails a default set of institutions, an origin of institutions would be same as a change or an innovation of institutions (Ostrom, 1990: 139ff) . If so, the concepts like institutional evolution, institutional change, and institutional innovation can have the same connotation and in this study we use them interchangeably.
The central theme of New Institutional Economics (NIE) is to explain the emergence of institutions. However, the research programme for a general theory of evolution of institutions is still incomplete (Hodgson, 1998; Bates, 1988) . It is true that the theory of institutional evolution, like the phenomenon it purports to explain, has undergone evolutionary change (Bush, 1987 (Bush, : 1076 . The way institutions are generated are less well understood, although much work has been done on this issue (Heath, 1976) . That is, we
do not yet have a well-founded theory of how particular social norms come about (Basu, 1986 (Basu, :1895 (Nelson, 1986) . In fact, the domain of processes is the most exciting and the largely unexplored area in social sciences (Ensminger, 1992) .
These processes are important also because they help in predicting future institutional development by narrowing down future choices (North, 1990: 93ff) and also to explain why sometimes the spontaneous movements to more efficient institutions does not take place on account of path dependence or institutional lock-in (Arthur, 1989; David, 1985; North, 1990 ).
Evolutionary models make up for this limitation by giving importance to the processes underlying the evolution of institutions. They treat institutional change as endogenous to economic system. For instance, Veblen, argues that the technological change effected by a process of cumulative causation is the fundamental factor that explains institutional change. To quote, "The problem-solving process of community generate innovations in technology thereby changing industrial environment in which community works and this changed environment produce further changes in prevalent habits of thought about how to conduct community's affairs" (Veblen, 1919 , cited in Bush, ibid: 1087 . North (1990) argues that change in relative prices leads one or both parties to an exchange. When they perceive that either or both could do better with an altered agreement or contract, an attempt is made to renegotiate the contract. The contracts, however, remain nested in a hierarchy of rules; attempt is made to devote resources to restructure the rules provided the expected benefits exceed the cost of innovation. Thus, through incremental changes institutional evolution takes place. Ostrom (1992) distinguishes three levels of rules cumulatively affecting institutional evolution. Operational rules that affect day-to-day decisions of the actors, collective -choice rules that determine the changes in the former, and finally, constitutional-choice rules, which, in turn, govern the crafting of the collective-choice rules (p.47). However, it is contended that institutional choice theory that argue that rational actors can bring about institutional change based on individual calculus of costs and benefits of investing for a proposed change (Ostrom, 1990; Wade, 1988) lacks concern for socio-political and cultural embeddedness of institutions (Peters, 1987:178) . Ruttan and Hayami (1984) give due concern for such factors too and provide a more comprehensive version of the evolutionary model of institutional change as endogenous to the economy.
In the light of the theoretical review and the feel of the empirical data we collected from the field and from the secondary sources, the induced institutional innovation model, espounded by Ruttan and Hayami (1984) is found to be a suitable framework to analyse the evolution of kadakkodies. Therefore, let us have a brief exposition of the model (see Figure 1 ).
Figure1: Institutional Innovation Model
In this model institutional evolution is viewed in the standard supply and demand framework. The sources of demand for institutional evolution are changes in relative resource endowments and technology. The supply of institutional evolution depends on the supply cost incurred for the collective action to bring about the change, which involves struggles among various vested interest groups and their power structures.
Cultural endowment, including religion and ideology, is seen an important variable influencing the supply cost. The authors do not provide any strict definition of these terms, rather, they use them in a broad sense so as to include all relevant variables. Thus, changes in relative resource endowment would mean changes in relative access to factor endowments, product demand, and to income streams on account of changes in demographic factors, market demand and prices, factor productivity etc. Cultural endowment refer to things and events, especially those transmitted from the past, that affect the relationships between persons and in turn, affect the cost of collective action (religion, ideology etc. come under this). Mobilisation of substantial political resources may also be involved in the case of certain large-scale institutional innovations, which would be determined by the costs and returns of political markets. 
Explaining the Evolution
Very little is written on Kadakkodies. Oral history too on the origins of Kadakkodies was found difficult for our initial interviews with fishermen revealed their shallow sense of history on the origins of this ancient institution. However, we could get certain important clues regarding the fall of Kadakkodies in many villages in recent times that could contribute to the understanding of Kadakkodi innovations. By late seventies and early eighties Kadakkodi system disintegrated in some of our sample villages, and to our surprise, during the same period, at Vadakara taluk of Kozhikode district and at Mahe, Kadakkodies had undergone some restructuring to preclude disintegration. Interestingly, only in Kasargod district Kadakkodies have been persisting uninterrupted throughout these years. An equally interesting, if not more, phenomenon that attract our attention is that all throughout this period, community management institutions of the type of kadakkodi did not develop in the southern region of Kerala coast. These different phenomena look very important in an enquiry into the evolution of kadakkodies. These lead us to ask four important questions:
1) Why and how Kadakkodies got disintegrated in many villages during the period of late70s early 80s?
2) How at the same time Kadakkodies could innovate and withstand disintegration in some other villages?
3) How Kadakkodies could persist in the villages of Kasargod district? 4) Why kadakkodies did not develop at all in the southern coastal region?
Answer to these questions shall unravel the story of institutional evolution. An understanding of the major features fishery resource and fishing technology of the said period, nonetheless, seems imperative in answering these qestions.
Specificities of Resource Endowments and Technology in the late Seventies and early
Eighties:
The period since mid-seventies was very crucial in the fishery history of Kerala on account of the uneven development in fishing technology and fish production. We have observed in section 2 that since early 50s there came about mechanisation of fishing technology as part of the modernisation drive of Indian five-year planning. It aimed at increasing production and particularly to enhance foreign exchange reserves of the country through export of marine products. The mechanisation drive that started with introduction of mechanised gill netters gave way to the spread of bottom trawlers that targeted shrimps as there came sudden boom in the export demand for shrimps to US and, later, also to Japan. In the absence of any regulations of space and time for bottom trawling, the trawlers began to fish in the relatively richer coastal waters.day in and day An inevitable outcome of these technological externalities was a significant appropriation externality. Both in production and value, the share of traditional sector dwindled considerably. Its final outcome was a low and stagnant level of real income for the traditional fishermen and that too falling since the mid-seventies while their counterparts in the mechanised sector could enjoy a much higher level of income (see Figure 2 ). 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982-83 1985 1987 1989 1991 
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Faced by such a level of impoverishment as well as other technological externalities the traditional fishermen have taken up two major strategies -institutional and technological.
On the technological front, the most important intervention was the introduction of outboard motors for the propulsion of traditional fishing crafts. In several pockets, this was followed by the ingress of ring seine and mini-trawling operations. As we proceed, we will observe that these technological innovations too impacted their other strategy, namely, the institutional innovations.
Institutional Innovations
Disintegration of kadakkodies, restructuring of kadakkodies, persistence of kadakkodies, and emergence of KMFRA are the four major aspects of institutional innovations during the said period. Of these we shall be focussing on the first three aspects, related to kadakkodies.
Disintegration of Kadakkodies
By late nineteen seventies the Kadakkodi system got disintegrated in some of the coastal villages like Chalil, Dharmadam, Chalium, Puthiyappa, Mahe, Azheekodu etc and in the early eighties, in Kannur, Quilandy, and Parappanangady. The first thing to happen in all these villages was the dilution of an important Kadakkodi regulation, namely, prohibition of night fishing. It happened as follows: As more and more mechanised boats started night fishing the traditional fishermen who used to go for fishing in the day-time began to experience more decline in the catch. They were unequivocal in attributing their paucity of catch to this problem of night trawling. However, the Kadakkodies found themselves helpless to deal with a technology of that ilk which seemed outside the purview of their control. Gradually, though there were no collective decisions of Kadakkodies to revoke the ban on night fishing, fishermen groups, on their own initiative, ventured to do night fishing. Interestingly, no overt dissent came from any Kadakkodi; instead, as more and more groups followed suit, the Kadakkodies were forced to change the regulation by restricting the prohibition of night fishing to the monsoon season. A change in the very perspective of such a regulation is also notable. Earlier, prevention of appropriation externalities of night fishing on the day fishers was the chief motive. But, now, it has given way for just risk avoidance since night fishing during monsoon was considered highly risky.
Increasing heterogeneity in fishing technology has contributed to the disintegration. For instance, the spread of motorisation was a factor that had become instrumental in the weakening of the Kadakkodi system. Until then, almost all the fishing groups of a village used to go for fishing in almost the same area. Landing too was at the same landing centres and time. However, the motorisation diluted such a village boundary notion.
Thanks to motorisation, fishermen could go faster and farther for fishing. They could land at markets of their choice. As a result, the repeated interactions of fishermen of the village became less intense. Remember, repeated interactions of resource users and clearly defined boundaries of resource and resource users are among the principles for successful CPR regulations (Ostrom, 1990: 91; Baland and Platteau, 1996) .
Introduction of ring seine since early eighties was an offshoot of motorisation. Very severe was the protest it received throughout the marine villages of northern Kerala, especially, wherever the kadakkodies were strong. The ground of protest was mainly that ring seine would fish away the resources at the disadvantage of those who do not have that gear. Nonetheless, the success stories of ring seines from nearby villages tempted some to join the band-wagon. This paved way for rifts within the same kadakkodi members between pro-ring seine and contra-ring seine groups. Also to be noted is the fact that the protest of the kadakkodies was not based on any management objective other than a distributional motive that those who do not have ring seine would be at Mushrooming of primary co-operative credit societies in the fisheries sector in the eighties deserves a special mention in this context. The main purpose of these societies was to mobilise credit to finance the share system of ownership of ring seine units.
Formation of these societies were mostly on political lines (see also Kurien, 1992 9 Prior to ring seine, a medium craft with a standard gear was costing only around Rs 20,000 (Kurien and Willman, 1982) whereas with ring seine, the cost of craft -gear combination reached Rs 4 lakhs by the end of 80s (Chacko, 1998) and above Rs 9 lakhs by 1998. 10 The names given to the ring seine units at Kannur themselves are revealing. Most of the names are those of their respective political leaders: EMS, AKG, Azhikodan, Imbichi Bava, Indira Gandhi, Rajeeve Gandhi and so on.
Another factor that had a dampening effect on the kadakkodi system was the sudden boom in the inflow of migrant fishermen. Circulation of fishermen from the southern Kerala towards the north for hook and line and drift net fishing, though not a new phenomenon, had registered a steep increase since 1980. A detailed study of labour migration from four villages of Trivandrum that are having relatively larger proportion of migrant fishermen (Rajan, 2001 ) reveals this trend (Table 1) . (20) 404 (80) 505 (100) 162 (30) 378 (70) 540 (100) 35 (9) 335 (91) 370 (100) 46 (11) 372 (89) 418 (100) Note: figures in parentheses represent percentage to total Source : Rajan (2001) Apart from the traditional wisdom of the fishermen that fishes such as pomfrets, mackerels, sardines,anchovies etc migrate from the sandy and hot sea bottom of southwest coast to the muddy and cooler north-west from September onwards (Rajan, ibid) and specialised skill of Trivandrum fishermen in hook and line fishing, the increasing resource crunch and the technological capability gained through motorisation have been important reasons for the said boom in migration. We could learn that with the growing number of migrants the incidence of conflicts with the local fishermen too increased as the former paid little regard for the local rules and customs. Thus the problem of cultural heterogeneity increased and the kadakkodies found it difficult to take action against them as they tried to evade such actions by moving from one place to another. In Dharmadamm village, there was another allegation of dynamite fishing by migrant fishermen. However, the local fishermen had to approach the police station to book the culprits since the kadakkodies were unable to take effective action. Similar instances were also reported from Chalium and Chalil villages. Once rule violations go unpunished, it reinforces violations and thus further weakens the regulatory mechanism.
Many of our respondents underscored the importance of able and fair leadership to maintain kadakkodies. Shortage of able and impartial leadership was one among the local problems some of the kadakkodies encountered. The kadakkodi of Parappanangadi has been a case in point.
These were the important factors behind the process of disintegration of kadakkodies in many villages. Nonetheless, it looks paradoxical that during this period, in a few other villages, Kadakkodies did not disintegrate; instead, they got restructured and restrengthened.
2) Restructuring of Kadakkodies
In Vadakara taluk there are seven kadakkodies. Even though the demand forces of changes in technology and resource endowment acting on kadakkodies were similar to that we discussed above, some specific strategies employed by the Kadakkodi leadership could successfully counter the negative forces of disintegration. Three such strategies were the following : i) Membership in kadakkodies was broadened from the notion of valakkar to all the fishermen in the village.
ii) All the seven kadakkodies of the taluk have been nested into a Federation.
iii) Apart from the usual functions of kadakkodies they began to take up new functions to suit the changing needs of the fisherfolk.
In order to understand the implications of these changes, let us concentrate on the Kadakkodi at Chombala, which took the initiative in this restructuring process. When it was observed that with the new system of ownership, namely, share-ownership, the valakkars' interest in Kadakkodies started waning, the leaders of Kadakkodies mooted the idea of giving membership to share owners and fishworkers. With that broadened norm of membership almost all the fishermen started taking interest in the kadakkodi affairs. 
A Postscript
We should add, however, a postscript here. On our second visit to Chombala we could learn that since 2 nd June, 1999 the Chombala kadakkodi stands temporarily suspended.
The events that led to this incident are worth to be stated here for they could throw more light into the processes of institutional evolution. It happened as follows : As usual, the A few interesting insights are provided by this chain of incidents. First of all, it reveals that political heterogeneity and narrow political interests can adversely affect collective action. Secondly, it was 'outsiders', namely, those who do not belong to Chombala village who violated the norm. With the arrival of the modern fishing harbour fishermen from other villages are also entitled to land there for fish sale. In effect, it has diluted the notion of a well defined village boundary that was being enjoyed till date. Thirdly, the well established fact that informal institutions gets strengthened once they are supported by the formal state organisations and weakens otherwise (Baland and Platteaue, 1996) stands established.
3) Persistence of Kadakkodies -the case of Kasargod District
Surprising it is to see that despite the demand-pull factors and despite the absence of any structural innovations like those we observed in Vadakara taluk, kadakkodies continues to function smoothly in the villages of Kasargod district. Our inquiry into this interesting phenomenon takes us beyond the economic factors.
The very structural specificity of the Kasargod kadakkodies provides a key to the analysis
The temple centricity of kadakkodi and the role of the Achanmar as magistrates do give a religious flavour to kadakkodies in Kasargod. Moreover, not only the economic issues related to fishing but all other important social issues come under the purview of kadakkodi. Thus in Kasargod, kadakkodi becomes a socio-economic and religious entity. To borrow the phrase of Granovetter (1985) , kadakkodi remained here 'socially emmbedded'. This interlinkage commands stricter adherence from the members.
Secondly, the people in these villages form a closely-knit community. First of all, they belong to the same caste -Hindu-Araya; the caste consciousness is very alive too.
Institution of caste creates a 'triadic -relationship' (Simmel, 1950) . That is, relation of individual i with individual j depends on each of their relation with uninvolved third parties (Basu, 1986 (Basu, :1894 fishing. This is an added incentive for peer monitoring that helps rule-compliance.
These are all factors that facilitate the persistence of kadakkodies and more importantly, the cultural homogeneity. It does not mean that kadakkodies in Kasargod are totally averse to any changes. They too are sensitive to the changes that occur elsewhere, especially in the economic sphere. For instance, the blanket prohibition of night fishing has given way for a seasonal prohibition during monsoon.
4) Non-emergence of kadakkodies in the southern coast
It is found that there have been several factors that constrained the development of kadakkodies in the south. Specificities of marine environment and technology, institutional lock-in , and the varying levels of social capital etc are the important factors. (Knight, 1947 , quoted in Sen, 1995 .
Regional specificities of marine environment and fishing technology
Feudalistic encapsulation of technology
As we move northward from south Kollam, especially, to Ambalapuzha and Cherthala taluks, fishing technology was characterised by large fishing crafts (plank canoes) in which 20 to 30 people could go for fishing. Albeit such an environment had better prospects for mutual interactions and collective endeavours among fishermen, the characteristics of ownership pattern of the fishing implements that prevailed there was one that dampened such an environment. The poor fishermen were unable to invest in such crafts. No wonder, the local landlords (janmies) became the owners of the fishing implements and the fishermen were by and large their tenants (in the case of karamadi or shore seines such an ownership pattern prevailed also in Trivandrum). Thus there existed in this coastal society a class polarisation between capitalist-landlords and tenantfishermen and the production relationship was a sort of bonded labour. Landlords being the final authority in deciding when to fish, how to fish, and how to sell, alternative (Sreedhara Menon, 1999) and the legitimacy of super imposing a political agenda on the workers' struggle is questioned (Kaimal, 1994) it is well recognised by the historians that Bush, 1987) . 12 The level of exploitation experienced by the fisherfolk was near to slavery. Economic and social exploitation was meted out. The economic exploitation was basically by alienating the workers from their output. Out of the fish catch only a miniscule part went to the fishermen. It was divided into seven parts : one for craft; one for gear; one for sail; one for charity; one general; one for henchman; one for church; and one for the fishermen. The first five parts were appropriated by the capitalist landlords. The one-seventh share the workers received was at a value fixed by the landlord to whom alone they could sell the fish. Plus this was the social exploitation. Fishermen were not allowed to keep moustache or fold their dothi in front of the landlord; fishermen's wives and daughters became prey to many advancements by the landlords and their sons ( personal communication with Mr. Ben ; see also George , 1975; Kaimal, 1994; Dietrich and Nalini, 1989) . In the nearby village, Purakkad, too such exploitation was prevalent. Thakazhy, a renowned Malayalam novelist narrates them picturesque in the famous novel, 'Chemmeen' . 13 Recently, this struggle has been formally recognised by the Government of India as part of the national independence struggle.
the fishermen was the Ambalapuzha Taluk Matsyathozhilai Union to be started in 1940 (George, 1975) .
Thanks to this struggle not only in Punnapra but also in many other villages feudalistic exploitation was largely terminated. In Punnapra fishermen started operating the crafts previously owned by the janmies as 'people's crafts' braving their landlords (Dietrich and Nalini, 1989) 14 .
In short, only by around 1950s the fishermen of these villages could shatter the shackles of feudalistic slavery. However, still there remained yokes of vertical structures.
Prevalence of vertical religion
Vertical social structures like autocratic regimes, hierarchical religions etc are found to dampen fellowship, trust, and cooperation among people. This is well illustrated in the studies on the north-south divide in the Italian development experience (Banfield, 1958; Putnam, 1993) . it is said that even in rural communities of Philippines cheating is very common and collective action very difficult (Baland and Platteau,1996:134) . Interestingly, that too has been a predominantly Catholic country.
" A vertical network, no matter how dense and no matter how important to its participants, cannot sustain social trust and cooperation. Vertical flows of information are often less reliable than horizontal flows, in part because the subordinate husbands information as a hedge against exploitation. More important, sanctions that support norms of reciprocity against threat of opportunism are less likely to be imposed upwards and less likely to be acceded to, if imposed. Only a bold or foolhardy subordinate lacking ties of solidarity with peers, would seek to punish a superior" (1993:174, cited in Dasgupta 1999:396).
Dasgupta adds one more disadvantage with the vertical structures. Renegotiations of relationship between parties, in the wake of new economic opportunities, is less likely in vertical networks such as landlord-tenant whereas it would be of common interest to both the parties in a horizontal network (Dasgupta, ibid) .
Weighed down by such factors that dampen social relationship, southern Italy, says
Putnam, 'is permeated by defection, distrust, shirking, exploitation, isolation, disorder, and stagnation. All these intensify one another in a suffocating miasma of vicious circles'
(ibid, 177, cited in Platteau, 2000:329) .
These observations are of much interest to us because a similar situation prevailed in the southern coast of Kerala. Over and above the previously mentioned capitalist landlordworker tenant relationship, dominance of Catholic religion too was a characteristic of this area. Fishermen of Kerala , irrespective of their religion, are well known for their religiosity (Mathur, 1977; Houtart and Nalini, 1988 ). As we mentioned earlier, the vast majority of fishermen in southern Kerala belonged to the Catholic Church. Church remained not only highly hierarchical but also was one of the biggest landlords in the coastal area (Kaimal, ibid) . In the coastal communities the parish priests acted as the exofficio leader and no decision could be taken outside the priests' authority (Kurien and Achary, 1988; Dietrich and Nalini, ibid; Ram, 1991; Bavinck, 2001 ). There are many examples to show how the vertical bonds of authority acted in the parish communities and even destroyed the horizontal fellowship among the laity. The experience at Marianad fishing village in Trivandrum district, narrated by Dietrich and Nalini (1989) would be a good illustration. Marianad had the rare experience of fishermen, with the help of a few social workers, successfully initiating marketing societies, women's organisations etc.
But, later, with the arrival of a resident parish priest, things changed. It has been reported that he made several attempts to highjack these organisations to bring them under his control. Finally, he succeeded though the societies failed to function properly thereafter.
The kuthaka system that still prevails in some of the coastal parishes in Trivandrum for collecting contributions from the fishermen to the church fund is another verticalexploitative gesture. It is a fact that fishermen belonging to all the three religions are quite generous in giving donations to their places of worship. Nevertheless, in the kuthaka system the voluntariness and peronalised nature of contributions wither away. It is a system in which the church auctions off the monopoly right (kuthaka) to collect the contribution of fishing units (usually, 5 % of the daily fishing income) annually to private parties who bid the auction. The bidders have to pay the church half the amount at the beginning of the year itself and the rest in a few instalments. They, in turn, would go for very strict and meticulous collection from the fishermen so as to maximise their profit. If any 'arrears' remains at the end of the year, they inform the church and it is collected as and when the 'defaulters' approach the church for spiritual needs like baptism, marriage etc. Though for the church it is an 'efficient' means of collecting revenue with little transaction cost, the system spoils the very spirit of donation and makes it a compulsory taxation. Further, it is interesting to observe that this taxation turned out to be taxation without representation. Though the contributions from the fishermen constituted the major source of the income of the coastal parishes, they were given practically no role in the decision -making. The parish committees were mostly comprised of the upper class section of the parishioners. In short, the religious environment of the Catholic fishermen was not at all conducive to foster horizontal relationship and fellowship.
The lot of Hindu fisherfolk, the second largest group in the south, albeit slightly better in this regard, remained much to be wished for. They were having a more collective system of village committees called Karayogams. However, until nineteen sixties they were dominated by the village headmen, belonging to the ilk of capitalist-landlords. Thus, there too the tradition of horizontal associations of fishermen was not that bright, though later system has become more horizontal.
Low levels of social capital
By the term, social capital we mean the behavioural patterns of trust and cooperation (Solow, 1999 ) that create and strengthen relations among persons and organisations . Or, it can be conceived as a stable structure of interpersonal relationships (Reisman, 2001:52) . Essentially, social capital refers to social trust 16 .
Creation of social capital is often found to be the legacy of long traditions of historical development (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995) . And we have seen that, unfortunately, the fishing communities in the southern Kerala were historically under the grip of vertical . Empirical cases also support our contention. In our study, we have considered the case of repayment of loans that have been taken by fishermen from Matsyafed (a cooperative federation managed by the government to provide financial and technical support to traditional fishermen). See Table 2 . The repayment schedule is quite revealing. Repayment by the fishermen of southern Kerala is far below that of their counterparts in northern Kerala. Still more significant it is to observe the near total repayment from Kasargod district. Here we should add the information we received from the fishermen of Kasargod. When some of them decided to quit Matsyafed, on their dissatisfaction with its functioning, they first cleared their dues with Matsyafed even by borrowing money from middlemen. Conversely, in the south, some fishermen confessed that lack of ability to pay was not the sole reason for their nonrepayment; negligence and the expectation of waiving the loans by the government in the future were also there among the reasons.
c) More feuds in the south: It is observed that incidence of feuds are relatively more in the southern coastal villages than in the north (Dietrich and Nalini, ibid) . Villages such as Thangassery in Kollam district, Poonthura , Vizhinjam, and Anjengo in Trivandrum district are notorious for the frequent quarrels and clashes.. There are several instances of instant emotional outbursts even on trifles. Communal tensions too occur, albeit sporadic.
It seems that the rule of reciprocity observed by Malinowsky in the primitive societies is active in these villages: "I do things today so that you will reciprocate tomorrow, and I myself reciprocate what you did yesterday" (Anon, 1971 (Kurien and Vijayan, 1995) . The fishermen were so enthusiastic and there came in the eighties hundreds of such units. However, to much chagrin of these fishermen, within a few years of operation, most of these units disappeared 17 . Our study reveals that one of the important factors that led to their collapse was the lack of trust and unity among the share-holders. To corroborate, let us take a comparison of two units. advice of the supervisor, they came to an agreement to sell off the unit. On the other hand, the other unit, St Paul I, does well till date. Perfect transparency in accounts is maintained and no feud has been reported among the group members. The loan is fully repaid and now the unit has a good saving.
St Paul I and
An important lesson to be drawn from this comparison is that given the investment pattern, resource endowment, ownership and management pattern, a major determinant of success of a fishing unit is the mutual trust and unity among the group members.
Unfortunately, units that are having such characteristics are exceptions. In Punnapra village, for example, there were 36 thanguvallam units a decade ago, of which only nine are presently operational.
These four factors help us to make a rough assessment of the relative levels of horizontal trust and cooperation across the two regions of Kerala. Certainly, our discussion does not aim at making any normative judgement than to attempt an analytical exposition of the conduciveness of the given environment for the evolution of a community institution like kadakkodi. Further, this analysis need not end on any pessimistic note because it is empirically shown that even in the absence historical traditions of social capital, by purposive designing of certain institutions social capital can be generated as seen in the case of irrigation management systems and so on (Ostrom,1994; Wade, 1988 etc.) . In its simplest sense of the term, social capital may include even ' the ability of people to work together for common purposes in groups and organisations' (Fukuyama, 1995) . Social capital may be created as a by-product of membership in civic associations or as a byproduct of conflicts over distribution of resources (Putnam, 1995; Ostrom, 1994; Knight, 1992; Yadama and Margie, 2001) . No wonder, in the south where such conflicts were more, unionisation of fishermen under an independent trade union became stronger and its agitation and struggles have been instrumental in the introduction of KMFRA in 1980. Changes in relative resource endowments did impact institutional innovations (relation C). The drastic fall in real income of traditional fishermen consequent to the reduction of their share in the fish production has been the most compelling factor behind the institutional innovations. The challenges faced by kadakkodies from the increasing influx of migrants did have resource dimensions. One, was that the migration of fishermen followed migration of fish. Two, the resource crunch the fishermen in the south felt during late seventies and early eighties had been a push factor for the boom in the migration. Three, migrant fishermen are often' biosphere fishermen' as against 'ecosystem fishermen' (Mc Goodwin, 1990 ) who often shift from one resource to another.
Conclusion
Impact of cultural endowments on institutional innovation (relation D) was found very strong. One of the factors behind the persistence of kadakkodies in Kasargod district has been the reputation effect that emanates from the closely-knit community system, while on the other hand, historical conditions of low levels of social capital had a disincentive effect in the south in developing any communitarian institutions. Also, ideologies did play a role. Communist ideology was a major attraction of the oppressed workers to uprise against exploitative production relations. The challenges raised by the migrant fishermen to the kadakkodi regulations also bears a cultural heterogeneity. We have observed that the migrants' lack of regard for kadakkodi rules could reinforce rule violations and weaken kadakkodies. Dilution of well defined boundary of resource users on account of influx of 'outsiders' in the Chombala fishing harbour turned out to be an Role of interest groups has also been found important in impacting collective action.
Struggles between different interest groups were involved in various phases of institutional innovations. We could observe that rivalry between political parties adversely affecting the functioning of Kadakkodies at Kannur, Chombala etc.
Finally, the heterogeneity factor is an important determinant of institutional innovations.
Technological, political and cultural heterogeneities have played a crucial role.
Strengthening of kadakkodies at Vadakara or their persistence in Kasargod have been contingent upon reducing such heterogeneities. Conversely, in the south, heterogeneous interests created by socio-political and religious structures inhibited the development of horizontal networks.
Presently, Kerala is on the path of decentralised planning process. It opens up challenges and opportunities for strengthening community-based local institutions for a more efficient, participatory and equitable resource management. This calls for a greater research attention to the evolutionary trajectory of such institutions.
